Recently, Norway, followed by the EU countries Ireland and Spain, has recognised a Palestinian state. How should the European Union respond and establish a unified stance? Can Europe provide positive impetus and ideas for a post-war order? How could these be realised? HA Hellyer asks

ISRAEL’S war on Gaza has gone on for more than nine months, following the Hamas-led attack on Israel in October 2023. A Palestinian territory that has been under Israeli occupation since 1967, Gaza, along with Israel and the Palestinian territories of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, it is about the same distance away from Europe, as Prague is from Berlin. Yet, when one compares this lack of activity to how the European Union has engaged on other issues in the ‘European Neighbourhood’, of which Israel and Palestine are a part, such as the war in Ukraine, or migration in the Mediterranean, there is a stark contrast.

;The European Union is almost wholly absent from directing any actual change on the ground.;

There are questions here to be raised. Should the EU be more involved? If so, why should the EU be more involved? How could the EU be more involved? And what are the obstacles inherent in such a proposition?

European neighbourhood and EU policy

THE European Union already recognises that Israel and Palestine are part of the broader ‘European Neighbourhood’; for 20 years, there has been a European Neighbourhood Policy aimed at fostering, ‘stability, security and prosperity in the EU’s neighbouring regions, both in the South and in the East.’ This is the European External Action Service’s own description about the ENP.

The ENP can be widely criticised on the basis of its own principles, because the stated goals include the EU working on the presumption of a commitment to partnerships, ‘based on shared values, the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and social cohesion’; a commitment that can be easily questioned looking at the EU’s own policies over the course of the past 20 years.

Nevertheless, European Union involvement on the Israel/Palestine question is eminently justifiable on the basis of the core components of that policy. Democracy in Israel, for example, faces crucial and critical challenges, partly because of the current government’s own assault on Israeli institutions of law and order, but also a wider trend that hitherto is not being paid sufficient attention to.

The Israeli political spectrum has consistently shifted to the right over the course of the past twenty years, to the point where ultra-nationalists such as minister of national security Itamar Ben-Gvir and finance minister Bezalel Smotrich, who would fit into the far-right in a European context, are essentially centre-right in the context of Israeli politics. Moreover, it is likely that in coming years, such politicians, or at least their sentiments, will become more and more significant.

Furthermore, the democratic deficit in the occupied Palestinian territories, be it in Gaza before the latest war, or in the West Bank, is also clearly a substantial challenge to any stable situation in a future Palestinian state. If we add ‘rule of law’, or ‘respect for human rights’ to our considerations around what challenges exist in Israel/Palestine, against the backdrop of the Israeli occupation, then the list of important topics increases dramatically.

‘The democratic deficit in the occupied Palestinian territories, be it in Gaza before the latest war, or in the West Bank, is a substantial challenge to any stable situation in a future Palestinian state.’

But there is a wider security question involved here. Even without an ENP, the EU would be well advised to use its influence to address the Israel and Palestine question for one simple reason — security. That has never been more evident than in 2024, when the conflict in Israel and Palestine threatens to destabilise not only the lives of Palestinians and Israelis, but also the wider Arab world and Middle East more generally. At multiple points since October 7, the threat of regional conflict has raised its head, and the potential for such an escalation continues every day; a conflict that would impact Europe in multiple fashions. To put simply, a stable wider Arab world is in Europe’s ultimate interest; a wider Arab world and Middle East region in turmoil is precisely the opposite.

It ought to be noted, as Spanish and Norwegian leaders, for example, have already done: if Europe wants to have credibility in the international community, it must act decisively when it comes to the Israelis and the Palestinians, or risk being accused of double standards when defending Ukraine against Russian aggression. European action on Israel and Palestine directly impacts on Europe’s ability to gather international support on its own security interests.

Basis of European approach: law

THE question then becomes how the EU could be more involved, and to what end? In this too, the answer is simple, while yet complex. The European Union is based, fundamentally, on the rule of law; such a phrase is included in numerous instruments of the European Union’s own treaties, as well as current policies.

The development and integration of the Union has depended, tremendously, on that notion, and the stated position of the EU’s joint foreign and security policy is that it is based, fundamentally, on ‘respect for international rules.’ Moreover, it seeks to ‘develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ Indeed, the aims of the EU within the wider world include ‘strict observance of international law’, as noted in Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty.

‘It ought to be noted, as Spanish and Norwegian leaders, for example, have already done: if Europe wants to have credibility in the international community, it must act decisively when it comes to the Israelis and the Palestinians, or risk being accused of double standards.’

Given that basic principle, the EU’s fundamental guiding principle ought to be the upholding of international law. When it comes to the Israel and Palestine question, that should and does include support for the ending of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and the establishment of a Palestinian state in those territories. It’s a rather straightforward proposition, but the complexities arise when the main obstacle to such a course of action is considered; the refusal of Israel to allow an ending of its occupation, let alone the establishment of a Palestinian state therein.

Some EU states, as well as non-EU European states, have recognised that the occupation is not about to end as a result of voluntary moves by the Israeli state, and have thus moved forward with a reverse plan, although it is unstated. The strategy is clear; recognise a Palestinian state, which then will put pressure on the Israelis to allow for the establishment of one, which necessitates the ending of an occupation.

‘The strategy is clear; recognise a Palestinian state, which then will put pressure on the Israelis to allow for the establishment of one, which necessitates the ending of an occupation.’

In this regard, they are joining an international consensus; 144 of the 193 member states of the United Nations already recognise the State of Palestine, including a majority of European states. When looking at the situation more precisely, it should be noted that within Europe, there are already eleven EU states (Sweden, Ireland, Spain, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland), and eleven non-EU states (Norway, Iceland, Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, Ukraine, Belarus, Montenegro, Turkey, Georgia, Vatican State), that enjoy full diplomatic relations with and recognition of the State of Palestine.

A further eight EU states (Denmark, France, Greece, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta, and Estonia) voted in favour of full UN membership for Palestine earlier this year, as well as one non-EU state (Lichtenstein). With a majority of European states recognising the State of Palestine, it is unsurprising that the EU maintains a representative office in Ramallah, accredited to the Palestinian Authority, although not to the State of Palestine, as EU member states have yet to make that decision.

Blocking EU-wide decisions on Israel

BUT the EU faces two major obstacles when it comes to actualising the full aims of this strategy. Firstly, the EU is not united on the point of recognising Palestine; there are several EU states that are close allies of Israel, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, which block EU-wide decisions on Israel, particularly during crisis situations. Secondly, the leverage that the EU has over Israelis and Palestinians more generally, and Israelis in particular, is not sufficient to push forward negotiations or change behaviour.

‘The leverage that the EU has over Israelis and Palestinians more generally, and Israelis in particular, is not sufficient to push forward negotiations or change behaviour.’

On the first, the EU faces a structural problem which has caused tremendous difficulty within for decades; this impacts its moves on Israel and Palestine, but also on many other issues, such as Ukraine. Hungary, for example, has famously been a major impediment in pursuing a cohesive and powerful European position on the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, given Hungary’s profound support for Moscow.

Nevertheless, despite this hindrance, the EU has managed to push forward with substantial support for Ukraine, both collectively as well as on a bilateral basis between member states and Ukraine. If there is sufficient political will, then EU leaders will find ways to minimise similar hurdles when it comes to pursuing a European position on Palestine and Israel.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that differences on Palestine and Israel are more pronounced than those on Ukraine, to the point that at the beginning of the latest war on Gaza, there were clear variances between the position of Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, and Josef Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Indeed, the latter criticised the former for an ‘absolutely pro-Israeli stance’, whose trip to Israel in October 2023 had ‘a high geopolitical cost for Europe’. However, the differences between the two have narrowed substantially since the early days of the war.

Of course, the decision on how to move forward is a political decision, and political decisions are made by politicians; Europe is no different, and EU politicians at various levels will make their assessments and calculations accordingly. Nonetheless, if the European Union is to proceed in a consistent fashion with regards to its own values, any decisions ought to take respect for international law as its basis. If it does not, then there is little point in discussing an ‘EU stance’ on any of these issues altogether, given the centrality of international law in how the EU’s foreign policy is meant to be formulated, according to the EU’s own treaties.

If that centrality of international law is upheld, however, and political will within the EU is strong enough to overcome its own structural blockages, then the ultimate question around leverage must be addressed. In this regard, there are two types of leverage that the EU ought to consider: indirect leverage, and direct leverage. Again, this comes down to political will, and the determination of European politicians to place international law at the centre of their own policies, as per not only their own commitments to international law, but also to the text and spirit of the founding treaties of the European Union.

Tools and leverage at Europe’s disposal

LEVERAGE with regards to the Israelis and the Palestinians directly does exist, far more so over the latter than the former. Leverage is a key aspect of how European decision making needs to proceed; as Borrell himself has stated, the international community may need to impose a two-state solution if Israel is unwilling, implicitly making the case that leverage must be used to push forward a change in behaviour.

‘It comes down to political will, and the determination of European politicians to place international law at the centre of their own policies.’

In this regard, the United States is the most crucial partner, as it, by far, operates the largest leverage over the Israelis, particular at the United Nations, where it consistently uses its veto to shield the Israelis from criticism, and in the transfer of arms to the Israelis, without which the Israeli defence establishment would be crippled. Different EU states, particularly Germany, do have substantial roles in this regard, but still far less than Washington DC.

There remain, however, other tools at the EU’s disposal, which should be considered:

Applying the sanctions regime vis-à-vis militant Palestinian groups and the wider Israeli settler movement: the European Council has already applied the sanctions regime to a small number of Israeli individuals and entities, and larger numbers of Palestinians. There are already highly restrictive measures in place against those who support, facilitate or enable violent actions by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for example.

Earlier this year, the EU moved to sanction a handful of Israeli settlers responsible for attacks on Palestinian communities in the occupied territories. However, if the EU does indeed place international law as the basis of its foreign policy, then far wider sanctions ought to be considered upon the wide conglomerate of the settler movement, which, by definition, violates international law simply by settling in the occupied territories.

‘If the EU does indeed place international law as the basis of its foreign policy, then far wider sanctions ought to be considered upon the wide conglomerate of the settler movement, which, by definition, violates international law.’

That would include Israeli ministers, as unpalatable as that might be in some quarters, and any and all imports that come from those occupied territories, as Belgium, for example, has called for.

Consequences due to the ICJ (International Court of Justice) and ICC (International Criminal Court) moves on Israeli and Palestinian officials and figures: it is not only the settler movement that ought to be brought into discussion in this regard. As a grouping that focuses on the upholding of international law, Israel’s actions that ignore or reject the rulings of the International Court of Justice, where Israel is currently in the dock on accusations of genocide, ought to be grounds for sanctioning other Israeli officials and politicians. The same should be said for the International Criminal Court, if warrants are issued for Hamas and Israeli officials; there should be no question that all such warrants must be upheld by all European states.

Furthering a review of the association agreement: the Association Agreement between the European Union and Israel has a number of stipulations that pertain to human rights; the violation of these, which are well documented, ought to be sufficient grounds alone for imposing sanctions. Reviewing the agreement, as Spain and Ireland asked for in February of this year, is not only in order, but suspension should be considered, given the current situation, unless significant moves are made by the Israeli government. This will require significant political will within the EU, due to splits between member states on the topic.

Economic measures: Consideration ought to be given to other economic measures, such as the suspension of investments into Israel by state entities, EU and non-EU European states alike. EU pressure on Israel in this regard is not insignificant, particularly when trade is concerned, considering that the EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, according for nearly a third of its exports.

Leverage on Palestinians: there is little EU leverage over Hamas, but there is an already existing system of restrictions and sanctions in that regard. Additionally, considering the aid packages that the EU currently has with the Palestinians, the EU does have substantial leverage with regards to the Palestinian Authority. The EU should focus on ‘more for more’ in this regard; not by threatening a withdrawal of aid, particularly at a time of tremendous suffering, but proposing increased access to European markets for Palestinian trade, in exchange for improvements in governance by Palestinian authorities.

Humanitarian aid: Increased support for UNRWA, the main UN agency responsible for Palestinian refugees, at a time when the United States has cut off funding, would be of significant importance, as well as wider humanitarian support, at a time when Gaza in particular is facing famine and starvation as a result of the war on Gaza.

State of Palestine recognition: Moreover, EU member states should push forward on recognition of the State of Palestine. Belgium and Portugal would be responding to widespread popular opinion domestically in this regard, and Malta would simply be formalising their relationship with the Palestinians, which one diplomat described as already 90per cent there, with de facto recognition already in play.

The EU would need to resist pressure from Washington, which reportedly was already placed on Malta to avoid voting in favour of Palestinian membership at the UN, but this in itself is a test of European solidarity, considering widespread support for recognition in and out of Europe.

‘The EU would need to resist pressure from Washington, which reportedly was already placed on Malta to avoid voting in favour of Palestinian membership at the UN.’

In this regard, they should consider Norway’s own admission about recognition, which was that Oslo had come to the conclusion that despite giving birth to the Oslo Accords, they ‘could no longer wait for the conflict to be resolved” before recognition. Such is the reality on the ground.

Indirect leverage: Nevertheless, as noted, leverage by the EU, as a grouping but also in terms of bilateral engagement, is limited in comparison to the US with regards to Israel, and Arab states with regards to the Palestinians. Direct leverage, however, is only one type of leverage; indirect leverage also exists.

The EU’s relationships with the United States, as well as Arab states (particularly Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar in this context) are important. If the United States were to use the leverage it has over the Israelis, and Arab states were to simultaneously use their leverage over the Palestinians, the prospects for a genuine and sustainable peace settlement in Israel/Palestine would be far easier to materialise. Not simply with regards to the current war on Gaza, but a far wider resolution to a conflict that has raged for many decades.

It is not that the EU does not have the ability to play a tremendously impactful role on the Israel/Palestine file; rather, it is that the EU has not, hitherto, fulfilled the quite wide potential that it has. There are tools at its disposal that the EU could use to bring about meaningful change in its wider European Neighbourhood, to the benefit of both Israelis and Palestinians; the question is, does it have the political will to do so?

Qantara.de, July 11. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, and political economy, HA Hellyer has extensive experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments across the west, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.